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NOTES 
Timeliness of Petitions for Judicial Review Under Section 
106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)1 
provides for exclusive review2 of "all final orders of deportation" in 
the United States Courts of Appeals.3 In passing this legislation, Con-
gress sought to "create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial 
review"4 of deportation orders. This form of review was designed to 
eliminate the bringing of repeated, meritless appeals by aliens5 while at 
the same time ensuring the fairness of judicial review procedures. 6 
With the aim of expediting judicial review,7 Congress provided in sec-
tion 106(a)(l) that "a petition for review may be filed not later than six 
months from the date of the final deportation order."8 
Section 106(a), however, does not define the phrase "final deporta-
tion order" and, during the early history of the statute, courts differed 
on its correct interpretation in a variety of contexts.9 In Foti v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, 10 the Supreme Court resolved some 
of these issues, adopting a generous reading of the statute. The Court 
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982). This Note will generally refer to the section numbers of the 
INA, rather than to the United States Code numbers. For a conversion chart matching the 
sections of the INA to sections of Title 8 of the United States Code, see T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. 
MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY lxxxi-lxxxii (1985). 
2. For a discussion of exceptions to the exclusivity of judicial review of deportation orders in 
· the courts of appeals, see note 25 infra. 
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982). 
4. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1961); see also Part III.B.3 infra. 
5. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1961); see also Parts III.B.3 & III.B.4 
infra. 
6. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-33 (1961); see also Part III.B.5 infra. 
7. See, e.g., Letter from Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White to Rep. Emanuel Celler 
(Apr. 18, 1961), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1961) ("[I]n order 
to speed up the judicial review, the special statutory review proceeding ••• must be instituted not 
later than 6 months from the date of the final order of deportation."). 
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1982). 
9. Compare Fong v. INS, 308 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1962) (courts of appeals have jurisdiction to 
review denials of requests for suspension of deportation made during deportation proceedings), 
with Foti v. INS, 308 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1962) (contra), revd., 375 U.S. 217 (1963), Holz v. INS, 
309 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1962) (courts of appeals do not have jurisdiction to review denials of 
requests for withholding of deportation), and Zupicich v. Esperdy, 207 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962) (same). See also Blngaic v. Flagg, 304 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1962) (courts of appeals have 
jurisdiction to review decisions of regional commissioners); Roumeliotis v. INS, 304 F.2d 453 
(7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 921 (1962); 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRA· 
TION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 8.9Ab, at 8-84 to -94.3 (1987); Note, Judicial Review of Final 
Orders of Deportation, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1155 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction to Review Prior Orders 
and Underlying Statutes in Deportation Appeals, 65 VA. L. REV. 403 (1979); Part I.B.1 infra. 
10. 375 U.S. 217 (1963). 
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held that "final orders of deportation" include not only determinations 
of deportability but also "all determinations made during and incident 
to the administrative proceeding conducted by a special inquiry officer, 
and reviewable together by the Board of Immigration Appeals."11 
The Court later ruled 12 that the denial of a motion to reopen a depor-
tation proceeding is reviewable by the courts of appeals under section 
106(a).13 The denial of a motion to reconsider a deportation order is 
11. 375 U.S. at 229. The court mentioned, as examples of such ancillary orders, "orders 
denying voluntary departure pursuant to § 244(e) and orders denying the withholding of depor-
tation under § 243(h)." 375 U.S. at 229. For other examples of ancillary orders reviewable 
under § 106(a), see 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.9Ab, at 8-86 to -87. 
Generally, orders that do not come within the courts of appeals' jurisdiction under § 106 are 
reviewable in federal district court. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 210 (1968); Salehi v. 
District Director, INS, 796 F.2d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 1986). See generally 2 C. GORDON & H. 
ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, §§ 8.5, 8.8; 8 id. § 63.02. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is a quasi-judicial body with exclusively appellate 
functions. It is completely separate from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
although BIA decisions are binding on all INS officers unless modified or overruled by the Attor-
ney General. l c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § l.lOb, at 1-71 to -72. In 1983, 
the Attorney General established the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which is headed 
by a Director and supervised by the Associate Attorney General. The Director is responsible for 
the general supervision of the BIA and the Chief Immigration Judge. Id., § l.9A. The Chief 
Immigration Judge supervises the immigration judges (formerly known as "special inquiry of-
ficers"). Immigration judges conduct exclusion and deportation hearings (also referred to as 
deportation proceedings or§ 242(b) proceedings) and carry out other duties assigned to them by 
the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.10 (1987); 1 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, 
§ l.lOAa, at 1-88.20 to -88.21. See generally Rewald, Judicial Control of Administrative Discre-
tion in the Expulsion and Extradition of Aliens, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 451, 456-57 (Supp. 1986). 
12. Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (per curiam). For a discussion of two later 
Supreme Court decisions on the scope of§ l06(a) jurisdiction, see Part I.B.3 and note 38 infra. 
13. The Supreme Court recently stated that "[t]here are at least three independent grounds 
on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen." INS v. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. 904, 911 (1988). 
First, it may hold that the movant has not established a prima facie case for the underlying relief 
sought. The Court has not decided what standard of judicial review applies when the BIA rests 
its denial of a motion to reopen on this ground. 108 S. Ct. at 911. Second, the BIA may hold 
that the movant has not met the requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 that previously unavailable, mate-
rial evidence be introduced. 108 S. Ct. at 911; see also note 29 infra. Or, where the movant 
requests reopening to apply for asylum, the BIA may hold that he has not "reasonably ex-
plain[ed] the failure to request asylum prior to the completion of the ... deportation proceed-
ing." 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1987); see also 108 S. Ct. at 911. In Abudu, the Court held that "the 
appropriate standard of review of such denials is abuse of discretion." 108 S. Ct. at 912. In 
discussing a third ground of denial, the Court stated that 
in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary (asylum, suspension of deporta-
tion, and adjustment of status, but not withholding of deportation), the BIA may leap 
ahead, as it were, over the two threshold concerns (prima facie case and new evidence/ 
reasonable explanation), and simply determine that even if they were met, the movant would 
not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief. We have consistently held that denials of 
this third ground are subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
108 S. Ct. at 912; see also INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 451 (1985) (BIA did not abuse 
discretion in denying reopening based on aliens' flagrant violation of the immigration laws). See 
generally 65 INTERPRETER RELEASES 220-24 (1988) (digestingAbudu). Although inAbudu the 
Court did not address review of denials of motions to reopen on the third ground where the grant 
of the underlying relief requested is not discretionary, it appears that an abuse-of-discretion stan-
dard would also apply in such a case, the reason being that 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 has been interpreted to 
give the BIA discretion in granting or denying motions to reopen. See 108 S. Ct. at 912 & n.10; 
see also Sangabi v. INS, 763 F.2d 374, 375 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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similarly reviewable. 14 The reviewability of these later orders creates a 
situation where there may be two or more reviewable orders with re-
spect to a single alien. 15 This has led the courts of appeals to disagree 
on the proper application of the six-month time limit on filing a peti-
tion for judicial review. 
The Ninth Circuit held in Bregman v. INS 16 that if a motion to 
reopen a deportation proceeding is filed within six months of the final 
deportation order, and the petition for judicial review is filed within 
six months of the denial of the motion to reopen, the court has juris-
diction to review both the final deportation order and the denial of the 
motion. This allows the court to review the final deportation order 
even though the petition for review was filed more than six months 
after entry of that order. The same rule applies to motions to recon-
sider.17 The Eighthls and First Circuits19 have also adopted this 
approach. 
The Third Circuit, by contrast, held in Nocon v. INS2° that a court 
of appeals may not review a final deportation order unless the petition 
for review is.filed within six months of the specific order for which review 
is sought. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits appear to follow this ap-
proach, although they have not yet been presented with facts similar to 
those in Bregman. 21 
The District of Columbia and Second Circuits have announced 
their intention to steer a middle ground. In Attoh v. INS, 22 the D.C. 
Circuit stated that "the Bregman rule might well be troubling in a case 
where there have been repeated and arguably frivolous motions to re-
14. See, e.g., Chudshevid v. INS, 641 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 1981) (denial of motion to 
reconsider is reviewable on abuse·of-discretion standard); see also Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 
U.S. 206, 213 (1968) (implying reviewability of motions to reconsider under § 106(a)). In ICC v. 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 107 S. Ct. 2360 (1987), the Supreme Court held that, "where 
a party petitions an agency for reconsideration on the ground of'material error,' i.e., on the same 
record that was before the agency when it rendered its original decision, 'an order which merely 
denies rehearing of ... [the prior] order is not itself reviewable.' " 107 S. Ct. at 2366 (quoting 
Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385, 387 n.7 (1974)). This holding greatly 
restricts the reviewability of motions to reconsider. 
15. Cf. Foti v. INS, 308 F.2d 779, 785 (2d Cir. 1962) ("Are there then two 'final orders,' and 
when do the six months of§ 106(a)(l) start to run?"), revd., 375 U.S. 217 (1963). 
16. 351 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1965). 
17. E.g .. Hyun Joon Chung v. INS, 720 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 
U.S. 1216 (1984). 
18. See Aiyadurai v. INS, 683 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982); Bae v. INS, 706 F.2d 866, 
869 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Shyllon v. INS, 728 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984). 
19. See Fuentes v. INS, 746 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 1984). The Fourth Circuit has suggested 
that it might follow the Ninth Circuit approach, although it has not been presented with the 
issue. See Sung Ja Oum v. INS, 613 F.2d 51, 53 n.2 (4th Cir. 1980). 
20. 789 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1986) (declining to follow Bregman). 
21. See Te Kuei Liu v. INS, 645 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1981) ("A petition for review must 
be filed within six months of the date of the entry of the order to be reviewed.''); Chui Hi Kim v. 
INS, 357 F.2d 904, 906 (7th Cir. 1966). 
22. 606 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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open or reconsider."23 Thus the court adopted Bregman "only insofar 
as it implicitly recognizes that intervening good faith petitions for ad-
ministrative relief may toll or suspend the running of the time limit."24 
This Note argues that courts should adopt a "good faith ap-
proach" to the section 106 timeliness issue. This approach would be 
similar to that suggested by the District of Columbia and Second Cir-
cuits. Part I discusses the statute, the relevant regulations, and the 
history of Supreme Court interpretation of section 106. Part II re-
views the various approaches to the timeliness question developed by 
the courts of appeals. Part III argues that although the statutory lan-
gµage and legislative history are ambiguous on the section 106(a) time-
lihess question, the good faith approach would best achieve the goals 
of section 106: judicial economy, discouraging dilatory tactics, and 
fairness to the alien. Part III also argues that the good faith approach 
is in keeping with past Supreme Court interpretation of section 106, 
judicial interpretation of similar timeliness questions with respect to 
review of orders of other administrative agencies, and the Supreme 
Court's approach to frivolous appeals by aliens. 
I. THE STATUTE, THE REGULATIONS, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT'S APPROACH TO SECTION 106(A) 
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
1. The Structure of Section 106 
Section 106 provides for review by the courts of appeals as "the 
sole and exclusive procedure" for judicial review of all "final orders of 
23. 606 F.2d at 1276 n.15. 
24. 606 F.2d at 1276 n.15 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit, in Fu Chen Hsiung v. INS, 
No. 79-4012 (2d Cir. May 15, 1979) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file), stated its general 
agreement with the Bregman rule but held that "on the facts of this case, where there have been 
three applications [to the BIA for discretionary review] ... , we hold that it is not appropriate to 
consider the merits of the deportation orders at this late hour." 
In Woodby v. INS, 370 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1965), revd., 385 U.S. 276 (1966), Woodby sought 
review of both a deportation order and the denial of a motion to reconsider. The INS contended 
that since the petition for review was filed more than six months after the date of the deportation 
order, the court was limited to reviewing the denial of the motion to reconsider. The court of 
appeals declined to decide this question, concluding that the deportation order should be af-
firmed on other grounds. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to consider what 
burden of proof the government must sustain in deportation proceedings. Woodby v. INS, 385 
U.S. 276, 277 (1966). In its brief, the INS stated that "in light of" Bregman, which the Ninth 
Circuit had decided subsequent to the decision of the court of appeals in Woodby, it was aban-
doning its contention that the court of appeals had not had jurisdiction to review the deportation 
order. See Brieffor Respondent at 8 n.3, Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (No. 40). In its 
decision, the Supreme Court did not resolve the timeliness issue, noting that "[i]n light of the 
Bregman decision, the Government before this Court expressly abandoned its contention that in 
this case the courts are limited to reviewing the denial of the motion to reconsider." 385 U.S. at 
287 n.20. Justice Clark, in the course of a dissent joined by Justice Harlan, argued that the Court 
should have resolved the timeliness issue and that the Bregman rule "would negate the congres-
sional purpose behind the insistence on timely filing in § 106(a)(l)." 385 U.S. at 291. 
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deportation."25 Section 106(a)(l) provides that "a petition for review 
may be filed not later than six months from the date of the final depor-
tation order."26 Further, section 106(c) provides that "[a]n order of 
deportation ... shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not 
exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right ... 
25. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1982) provides: 
The procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions of chapter 158 of title 28, shall apply to, 
and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of 
deportation, heretofore or hereafter made against aliens within the United States pursuant to 
administrative proceedings under section 1252(b) of this title [section 242(b) of the original 
Act] .... 
The provisions adopted, with certain modifications, were those of the Hobbs Administrative 
Orders Review Act (originally referred to in the statute as "the Act of December 29, 1950, as 
amended (64 Stat. 1129; 68 Stat. 961; 5 U.S.C. 1031 et seq.)," 8 U.S.C. § 1105a note (1982) 
(Codification)), currently codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2353 (1982), providing for judicial review 
of orders of certain other federal administrative agencies, such as the Federal Communications 
Commission, the Federal Maritime Board, and the Atomic Energy Commission. See H.R. REP, 
No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
2950, 2970-71; see also ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 107 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (1987); 
Part III.C.2 infra. 
There are certain exceptions to the exclusivity of judicial review of deportation orders by 
petition to the courts of appeals. Section 106(a)(9) provides that "any alien held in custody 
pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceed-
ings." See H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2973-74. See 
generally Williams v. INS, 795 F.2d 738, 743-45 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the scope of habeas 
jurisdiction under § 106(a)(9)); Salehi v. District Director, INS, 796 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (same). An alien need not be in actual physical custody in order to bring a habeas 
corpus action. Courts have found restraint sufficient to support habeas jurisdiction when an alien 
has been released on bond or is subject to an order of supervision. 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSEN· 
FIELD, supra note 9, § 8.6b, at 8-36. Whether the mere entering of a final deportation order 
against an alien who is not in custody or on bond or parole constitutes restraint sufficient to 
support habeas corpus appears to be in doubt. See id. § 8.6b, at 8-37 n.11 and cases cited therein; 
see also id. § 8.9Ab, at 8-81. 
Under § 106(a)(5), an alien who claims to be a United States national and presents a genuine 
issue of material fact will have his case transferred to a United States District Court for a hearing 
de nova on his nationality. See Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753-54 (1978). Under§ 106(a)(6), 
the validity of a deportation order may also be challenged in a criminal proceeding brought 
against an alien under§ 242(d) or (e) of the INA (relating to prosecution of aliens who willfully 
fail to depart from the United States after having been ordered deported, or who willfully violate 
the terms of supervision imposed following the entry of an order of deportation). See Hearings 
on H.R. 187 and S. 2212 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1961) (available from Congressional Infor-
mation Service) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of David Carliner, representing the As-
sociation of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers) (describing methods of judicial review 
permitted under the proposed legislation); 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, 
§ 8.9Ab, at 8-78 to -81 (1986). Section 106 does not explicitly address the availability of collat-
eral attack on the validity of a deportation order in a criminal proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 
(1982), which provides that an alien who has been deported and thereafter enters the United 
States without the consent of the Attorney General is guilty of a felony. However, the Supreme 
Court recently reversed a conviction under § 1326, United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. 
2148, 2155 (1987), holding that "a collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as 
an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively 
eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judicial review" because of violations of procedural due 
process. 
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(l) (1982). A judicial appeal is in the form of a petition for review 
and there is an automatic stay of deportation upon service of the petition on the INS, "unless the 
court otherwise directs." See INA§ 106(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1982). 
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or if he has departed from the United States after the issuance of the 
order."27 This exhaustion requirement means that the alien must ap-
peal the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
before filing a petition for judicial review.28 
2. Motions To Reopen or Reconsider 
The BIA may reopen or reconsider, either on its own motion or on 
the motion of the affected alien, any case in which it has rendered a 
decision. 29 A motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider are two 
27. INA § 106(c), 8 U.S.C. § l 105a(c) (1982) provides: 
An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has 
not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right under the immigra-
tion laws and regulations or if he has departed from the United States after the issuance of 
the order. Every petition for review or for habeas corpus shall state whether the validity of 
the order has been upheld in any prior judicial proceeding, and, if so, the nature and date 
thereof, and the court in which such proceeding took place. No petition for review or for 
habeas corpus shall be entertained if the validity of the order has been previously determined 
in any civil or criminal proceeding, unless the petition presents grounds which the court 
finds could not have been presented in such prior proceeding, or the court finds that the 
remedy provided by such prior proceeding was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity 
of the order. 
The courts have generally held that "departure," as used in the provision of§ 106(c) which 
provides that "[a]n order of deportation •.. shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien ... has 
departed from the United States after the issuance of the order," refers either to voluntary depar-
ture by the alien or "legally executed" departure when effected by the government. See Mendez 
v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1977) ("'departure' in the context of[§ 106(c)] cannot mean 
'departure in contravention of procedural due process'"); Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 
285, 287 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Thorsteinsson v. INS, 724 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984); Juarez 
v. INS, 732 F.2d 58, 59-60 (6th Cir. 1984); cf United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 
2154 & n.13 (1987) (noting Mendez but expressing no view as to its validity); Matter of Yih-
Hsiung Wang, 17 I. & N. Dec. 565 (BIA 1980) (alien who left the country during period of 
voluntary departure granted by immigration judge could not thereafter successfully bring a mo-
tion to reopen; distinguishing Mendez). But cf Umanzor v. Lambert, 782 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (expressing "serious reservations regarding the 'Mendez exception,'" since "if the 
exception is taken to its logical conclusion, any error or procedural defect at any point in the 
alien's deportation saga ... would render the departure illegal"). 
The statute also limits venue to the judicial circuit where the administrative proceedings were 
conducted or where the alien resides. INA § 106(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (1982). This 
provision was designed to prevent aliens from forum shopping for courts with crowded calen-
dars. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1961). Section 106(a)(4) provides that 
the Attorney General's findings of fact, if supported by "reasonable, substantial and probative 
evidence," are conclusive. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1982). See generally Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 
276 (1966); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 228-29 & n.15 (1963); 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 
supra note 9, § 8.9Ah, at 8-94.16 to -94.17. 
28. E.g., Bak v. INS, 682 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1982). However, if review is sought only of the 
denial of a motion to reopen, failure to take an administrative appeal from the deportation order 
does not bar a petition for review of the denial of the motion. The petitioner would, of course, 
first have to appeal to the Board from the denial of his motion in order to meet the exhaustion 
requirement. E.g., Toon-Ming Wong v. INS, 363 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1966); Ibrahim v. 
United States INS, 821 F.2d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1987). The finality of a final order of deporta-
tion is not affected by the possibility that the alien may be eligible for discretionary relief, for 
which no application has been submitted. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 936-37 (1983); 2 C. 
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.9Ab, at 8-89. 
29. The INA does not provide for motions to reopen or reconsider and the right to make 
such motions depends entirely on the administrative regulations. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSEN-
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separate and distinct motions with different requirements, although 
they are discussed together in the regulations. 30 A motion to reopen 
must be based upon new material evidence that was not available and 
could not have been discovered or presented by the alien at the prior 
hearing.31 A motion to reconsider must "state the reasons upon which 
the motion is based and shall be supported by such precedent decisions 
as are pertinent,"32 and requires no allegations of new facts. 33 There is 
FIELD, supra note 9, § 1.lOg, at 1-88.6 (Supp. Dec. 1987). 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
The Board may on its own motion reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a 
decision. Reopening or reconsideration of any case in which a decision has been made by 
the Board, whether requested by the Commissioner or any other duly authorized officer of 
the Service, or by the party affected by the decision, shall be only upon written motion to the 
Board. Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears 
to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could 
not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; nor shall any motion to reopen 
for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary 
reliefbe granted if it appears that the alien's right to apply for such relief was fully explained 
to him and an opportunity to apply therefor was afforded him at the former hearing unless 
the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances which have arisen subsequent to the hear-
ing. A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or in behalf of a 
person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the 
United States. Any departure from the United States of a person who is the subject of 
deportation proceedings occurring after the making of a motion to reopen or a motion to 
reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion. 
30. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987); see also note 29 supra. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1987) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
(a) Form. .•• Motions to reopen shall state the new facts to be proved at the reopened 
hearing and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Motions to recon-
sider shall state the reasons upon which the motion is based and shall be supported by such 
precedent decisions as are pertinent. In any case in which a deportation order is in effect, 
there shall be included in the motion to reopen or reconsider such order a statement by or 
on behalf of the moving party declaring whether the subject of the deportation order is also 
the subject of any pending criminal proceeding under section 242(e) of the Act, and, if so, 
the current status of that proceeding. If the motion to reopen or reconsider is for the pur-
pose of seeking discretionary relief, there shall be included in the motion a statement by or 
on behalf of the moving party declaring whether the alien for whose relief the motion is filed 
is subject to any pending criminal prosecution and, if so, the nature and current status of 
that prosecution. Motions to reopen or reconsider shall state whether the validity of the 
deportation order has been or is the subject of any judicial proceeding and, if so, the nature 
and date thereof, the court in which such proceeding took place or is pending, and its result 
or status. The filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not serve to stay 
the execution of any decision made in the case. Execution of such decision shall proceed 
unless a stay of execution is specifically granted by the Board or the officer of the Service 
having administrative jurisdiction over the case. 
(d) Ruling on motion. Rulings upon motions to reopen or motions to reconsider shall be by 
written order. If the order directs a reopening, the record shall be returned to the officer of 
the Service having administrative jurisdiction over the place where the reopened proceedings 
are to be conducted. If the motion to reconsider is granted, the decision upon such reconsid-
eration shall affirm, modify, or reverse the original decision made in the case. 
Other pertinent regulations are 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.5 and 242.22 (1987), concerning motions to 
reopen before immigration judges and other adjudicators. In most cases, motions to reopen are 
directed to the administrative authority that last made a decision in the case. 1 C. GORDON & H. 
ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 1.lOg, at 1-88.14. See generally Hurwitz, Motions Practice Before 
the Board of Immigration Appeals, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1982); l c. GORDON & H. Ro· 
SENFIELD, supra note 9, § 1.lOg; IA id. § 5.l3a. 
31. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987); see also note 29 supra. 
32. 8 C.F.R. § 3.S(a) (1987); see also note 30 supra. 
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no time limit specified in the regulations for making either type of 
motion except that neither may be brought after the departure of the 
person involved from the United States. 34 
The regulations also provide that "[m]otions to reopen or recon-
sider shall state whether the validity of the deportation order has been 
or is the subject of any judicial proceeding."35 The filing of a motion to 
reopen or reconsider does not automatically stay the execution of any 
decision made in the case, although a stay may be granted by the BIA 
or the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officer having 
administrative jurisdiction over the case. 36 
B. Supreme Court Interpretation of Section 106(a) Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court has decided questions of the reach of the juris-
diction of the courts of appeals under section 106(a) in four major 
cases. 37 Three of these decisions are helpful in approaching the timeli-
33. See Hunvitz, supra note 30, at 90 ("The motion to reconsid~r is a request that the Board 
reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an 
argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked, while the motion to reopen is usually 
based upon new evidence or a change in factual circumstances.") (footnotes omitted). Successful 
motions to reconsider usually involve a change in law or interpretation of law. Id. at 90 n.75. 
34. E.g., Matter of Estrada, 17 I. & N. Dec. 187 (BIA 1979); see also 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987); 
note 29 supra; 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 1.lOg, at 1-88.13 to -88.14. 
However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a motion to reopen may be brought after the alien has 
been deported if the deportation was not "legally executed." Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 
819 (9th Cir. 1981); see also note 27 supra (discussing the "Mendez exception"); note 149 infra 
and accompanying text. 
35. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1987); see also note 30 supra. 
36. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1987); see also note 30 supra. It is becoming increasingly important to 
obtain a stay pending consideration by the BIA of a motion, as the INS recently amended its 
regulations to facilitate prompt execution of final deportation orders. 63 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 659 (1986). Amended 8 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1987) eliminates the 72-hour advance notice of 
the time and place of surrender for deportation of an alien not already in custody. 63 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 538 (1986). The preamble to the regulation states: 
Immigration and Naturalization Service statistics have indicated that a majority of aliens do 
not comply with the notice to surrender, which has been commonly and derisively referred 
to as a "run letter". . . . 
The purpose of the revision is to provide the Service with an effective tool to enforce final 
orders of deportation ... in a timely manner .... 
. . . [I]mplementation of the revised regulation will institute procedures whereby the 
Service will assume custody of the alien respondent at the time of issuance of a final order of 
deportation by the immigration judge, or appellate tribunal or court of last resort. Upon 
assumption of custody, the respondent will be held a minimum of72 hours prior to removal 
by the Service, to ensure that due process is accorded the detainee. 
51 Fed. Reg. 23,041 (1986), reprinted in 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 549 (1986); see also note 93 
infra; 51 Fed. Reg. 34,081 (1986) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 242.l, 242.2, 242.7 and 287.3 to expe-
dite the processing of detained aliens in deportation proceedings), reprinted in 63 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 848-49 (1986). Aliens are "not infrequently" deported after unsuccessfully attempt-
ing to obtain a stay of deportation pending adjudication of their motion to reopen or reconsider 
by the BIA. Telephone interview with Gerald S. Hunvitz, Counsel to Director, Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (Mar. 11, 1988). 
37. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963); Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (per curiam); 
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see generally 
Dhangu v. INS, 812 F.2d 455, 458-59 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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ness question, although they do not address it directly.38 
1. Foti v. INS 
Foti v. INS was the Court's first decision interpreting the scope of 
the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals under section 106(a). Fran-
cesco Foti had entered the country on a seaman's visa and stayed ille-
gally for ten years. 39 At his deportation hearing, he conceded 
deportability, but applied for suspension of deportation under then 
section 244(a)(5) of the INA.40 The immigration judge ruled that Foti 
did not qualify for suspension of deportation and the BIA upheld this 
decision.41 Foti then brought an action in federal district court for 
review of the BIA's decision. The district court dismissed the action 
on the ground that under section 106(a) jurisdiction to review such a 
determination lay with the appropriate court of appeals. Foti then 
sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. 42 A divided Second Circuit, sitting en bane, dismissed the pe-
tition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the term "final orders of 
38. The fourth decision, INS v. Chadha, is important to any discussion of court of appeals 
jurisdiction under § 106(a), but is not directly relevant to the issues discussed in this Note. 
Chadha's deportation order had been issued after the House of Representatives "vetoed" the 
suspension of his deportation, as it had the power to do under § 244(c)(2) of the INA. See 462 
U.S. at 923-27. Chadha challenged the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision and, 
after exhausting his administrative remedies, brought a § 106(a) petition for review of the depor-
tation order. The court of appeals held that it had jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of 
the legislative veto. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411-15 (9th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that "the term 'final orders' in § 106(a) 'includes all matters on which the 
validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at 
the hearing.'" 462 U.S. at 938 (quoting Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d at 412). The Court distin-
guished Cheng Fan Kwok since the alien in that case "did not 'attack the deportation order itself 
but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it.'" 462 U.S. at 938 (quoting Cheng Fan Kwok, 
392 U.S. at 213). 
For a discussion of the impact of the Chadha decision on the scope of § 106(a) jurisdiction, 
see 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.9Ab, at 8-94.2 to -94.3 & n.55h. For 
examples of decisions reading Chadha narrowly, see Olaniyan v. District Director, INS, 796 F.2d 
373 (10th Cir. 1986); Tooloee v. INS, 722 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Legomsky, 
Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1311 n.116 (1986). Legomsky notes that even when the validity of the 
challenged order is a predicate for the ultimate deportation order, court decisions have tended lo 
turn on whether an evidentiary hearing would be required. He goes on to explain that the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), 
deemphasizing the need for a further evidentiary hearing, may endanger the more restrictive 
holdings. Legomsky also discusses the difficulty of reconciling Cheng Fan Kwok and Chadha. 
Legomsky, supra, at 1365-66. 
39. 375 U.S. at 217-18. 
40. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 5, § 244(a)(5), 66 Stat. 163, 214-16 (1952) (current 
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1982)). Section 244(a)(5) provided that 
the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to 
that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who .•. is 
a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien .... 
41. 375 U.S. at 218-19. 
42. 375 U.S. at 219. 
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deportation" in section 106(a) did not include discretionary orders 
withholding or suspending deportation.43 
In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, the Supreme 
Court held that 
all determinations made during and incident to the administrative pro-
ceeding conducted by a special inquiry officer, and reviewable together 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals, such as orders denying voluntary 
departure pursuant to § 244(e) and orders denying the withholding of 
deportation under § 243(h), are . . . included within the ambit of the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals under § 106(a).44 
The Court distinguished between the determination of deportability of 
an alien and the order directing his deportation. It reasoned that since 
1940, when the Attorney General was given the power to grant discre-
tionary relief under certain circumstances in deportation cases, admin-
istrative regulations had provided for determining deportability and 
ruling on applications for discretionary relief in a single proceeding 
before a special inquiry officer. When the alien was found deportable 
(or conceded deportability) and discretionary relief was denied, the 
hearing resulted in the issuance of a final deportation order. When 
discretionary relief was granted, no deportation order was issued, even 
if the alien was found to be deportable. 45 
The Court concluded that Congress must have known of this ad-
ministrative practice and had it in mind when it enacted section 
106(a). It found persuasive a colloquy between Congressmen Walter, 
Lindsay, and Moore that occurred during the House debates on the 
predecessor to the bill containing section 106: 
Representative Lindsay suggested that the legislative history should 
make absolutely clear "that if there is any remedy on the administrative 
level left of any nature, that the deportation order will not be considered 
final." Representative Walter agreed, and stated that "the final order 
means the final administrative order." With Representative Moore con-
curring, all three congressmen agreed that there would be no "final order 
of deportation" until after determination of the question of suspension. 
Significantly, Representative Walter, in discussing the running of the 
time period provided for the filing of petitions for review by the Courts 
of Appeals under the proposed legislation, stated that "the 6 months' 
period on the question of finality of an order applies to the final adminis-
trative adjudication of the applications for suspension of deportation just 
43. The court of appeals based its decision on the finding that the phrase "final orders of 
deportation" had a "well-understood meaning," based on its usage in § 242 of the INA, the 
section governing the procedure for determining the deportability of an alien. 308 F.2d at 780-
81. This meaning, the court found, was the "determination of deportability," as distinguished 
from discretionary determinations related to applications for relief from deportation. 308 F.2d at 
781-82. The majority discounted arguments in the dissent based on administrative practice and 
legislative history, which were essentially adopted by the Supreme Court in its decision reversing 
the court of appeals. See 308 F.2d at 782-87. 
44. 375 U.S. at 229. 
45. 375 U.S. at 222-23; see also 375 U.S. at 228. 
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as it would apply to any other issue brought up in deportation 
proceedings. "46 
In reaching the result in Foti, the Court took into account that "[t]he 
fundamental purpose behind § 106(a) was to abbreviate the process of 
judicial review ... in order to frustrate certain practices ... whereby 
persons subject to deportation were forestalling departure by dilatory 
tactics in the courts."47 The Court noted that the "key feature" of the 
congressional scheme directed at this problem was the elimination of 
the necessity for a suit in district court prior to obtaining review in the 
court of appeals. Since the Second Circuit's resolution of the jurisdic-
tional issue would require the alien to seek review of the denial of 
discretionary relief in district court and review of the adjudication of 
deportability in a court of appeals, the congressional purpose to pre-
vent bifurcation would be frustrated.48 The Court also found that a 
more expansive reading of section 106(a) jurisdiction promoted good 
judicial policy, since "[r]eview of the denial of discretionary relief is 
ancillary to the deportability issue, and both determinations should 
therefore be made by the same court at the same time."49 
2. Giova v. Rosenberg 
In Foti, the Court had left open the question whether section 
106(a) extended the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to include 
review of orders denying motions to reopen deportation proceedings. so 
In Giova v. Rosenberg, si decided the following year, the Court an-
swered this question in the affirmative. s2 The Court issued the follow-
ing one paragraph opinion, implying that it accepted the government's 
argumentss3 as to why denials of motions to reopen came within sec-
tion 106(a): 
46. 375 U.S. at 223-24 (quoting House debate at 105 CONG. REC. 12,728 (1959)); see also 
Part III.B.2 infra. 
47. 375 U.S. at 224; see also Part III.B infra. 
48. 375 U.S. at 225-27; cf Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) 
(courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review Nuclear Regulatory Commission orders denying 
citizen petitions; contrary approach would result in bifurcation of review of orders issued in same 
proceeding). See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 421-22 
(1965); Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Opti· 
mum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-36 (1975); Legomsky, supra note 38. 
49. 375 U.S. at 227; cf notes 56 & 71-72 infra and accompanying text; Part III.C infra. 
50. 375 U.S. at 231. The Court noted that "[t]he question is admittedly a somewhat different 
one, since such an administrative determination is not made during the same proceeding where 
deportability is determined and discretionary relief is denied." 375 U.S. at 231. 
51. 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (per curiam). 
52. The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review motions to reconsider has been nar-
rowed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 107 
S. Ct. 2360 (1987). See note 14 supra. 
53. In its brief before the Ninth Circuit in Giova v. Rosenberg, 308 F.2d 347 (1962), the INS 
suggested that "this Court may lack jurisdiction under [§ 106(a)] to review and decide peti-
tioner's appeal." Petitioner's Brief at 5, Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (No. 23). How-
ever, in its brief before the Supreme Court the INS argued that the court of appeals did have 
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Upon consideration of the submission of the United States that the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the cause re-
manded with directions to entertain the petition for review, and upon 
examination of the entire record, the judgment is reversed and the case is 
remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to entertain the peti-
tion for review.54 
The INS argued in Giova that although "[l]iterally, an order denying a 
motion to reopen ... is not a 'final order of deportation,' " since "[t]he 
order of deportation . . . was previously entered and permitted to be-
come final,''55 such an order should nonetheless come within the scope 
of section 106(a): 
[T]he aim of [section 106(a)] - as its legislative history confirms ... -
was to provide a single, unitary review procedure, in an appropriate 
court of appeals, for every litigable issue that might arise in a deportation 
proceeding. The denial of a motion to reopen such a proceeding surely 
presents such an issue . 
. . . [A] refusal to reopen ... occurs subsequent to the final order of 
deportation. But ... [t]he denial of a motion to reopen is made by the 
same officer who entered the final order of deportation - or, if the order 
was appealed, as here, to the Board of Immigration Appeals, then by 
that body, which, by its decision dismissing the appeal, in effect endorsed 
the deportation order and assumed responsibility for it - and is directly 
linked with the original proceedings out of which the deportation order 
arose. For these reasons it would be artificially literal, in the govern-
ment's view, to attempt to distinguish, for purposes of Section 106(a), 
between the final order proper and the denial of a motion to reopen the 
proceedings. In other words, an order declining to reopen the proceed-
ings is so intimately and immediately associated with the principal order 
(the final order of deportation) that it would be pointless to require that 
the subsidiary directive be treated otherwise than as an adjunct of the 
principal order - comparable to the denial of a motion for rehearing or 
reconsideration. So considered, it should be reviewable, the government 
believes, in the same forum in which the principal order would be re-
viewable if review of the latter were sought. 56 
jurisdiction. The petitioner (Giova), of course, also argued that the court had jurisdiction. Id. at 
7. 
54. 379 U.S. at 18. 
55. Brief for Respondent at 15, Giova (No. 23) (emphasis in original); see also Brief for Re-
spondent at 52, Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963) (No. 28). 
56. Brief for Respondent at 15-18, Giova (No. 23) (footnote omitted); see also Brief for Re-
spondent at 53-54, Foti (No. 28); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 217 (1968) ("Petitions 
to reopen, like motions for rehearing or reconsideration, are, as the Immigration Service urged in 
Foti, 'intimately and immediately associated' with the final orders they seek to challenge.") (quot-
ing Brieffor Respondent at 53, Foti (No. 28)); INS v. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. 904, 913 (1988) (com-
paring motions to reopen to petitions for rehearing and motions for new trials on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence); cf. Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 81 ("The motion to reopen is, at base, 
a request to alter an earlier decision."). 
The INS also argued in Giova that since "[a] refusal to reopen a deportation proceeding is ... 
truly ancillary to the deportation order in which the proceedings culminated," it would be "un-
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This reasoning - that denials of motions to reopen or reconsider 
should be treated as adjuncts of the principal deportation order - was 
elaborated in the Court's 1968 decision in Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS. 51 
3. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS 
Cheng Fan Kwok involved the issue of whether the courts of ap-
peals had jurisdiction to review the denial of a stay of deportation 
sought from an INS district director after a final order of deportation 
had been issued. Both the petitioner and the INS urged the Court to 
hold that section 106(a) was applicable to "all determinations 'directly 
affecting the execution of the basic deportation order,' whether those 
determinations have been reached prior to, during, or subsequent to 
the deportation proceeding."58 
In holding that the courts of appeals did not have jurisdiction to 
review the denial of the stay, the Court distinguished Foti and Giova 
since, unlike the order in Foti, the denial of a stay by the district direc-
tor was not entered in the course of a proceeding conducted by a spe-
cial inquiry officer under section 242(b )59 and, unlike the order in 
Giova, the denial of the stay was not a denial of an order to reopen 
such a proceeding. 60 The denial of a stay was issued in proceedings 
"entirely distinct from those conducted under § 242(b ), by an officer 
other than the special inquiry officer who ... presided over the depor-
tation proceeding."61 The Court added that the application for a stay, 
unlike a motion to reopen, "did not 'attack the deportation order itself 
but instead [sought] relief not inconsistent with it.' "62 
desirable for the refusal to reopen such a proceeding to be reviewable in a district court while the 
deportation order was being reviewed in a court of appeals." Brief for Respondent at 19; cf. note 
49 supra & notes 71-72 infra and accompanying text; Part III.C infra. 
57. 392 U.S. 206 (1968). 
58. 392 U.S. at 210 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 28). William H. Dempsey, Jr., who 
argued and filed a briefas amicus curiae by invitation of the Court, 392 U.S. at 210 n.9, argued, 
as the court of appeals had held, that § 106(a) encompassed only those orders made in the course 
of the § 242(b) deportation proceeding or denying motions to reopen or reconsider, see Brief for 
Amicus Curiae; 392 U.S. at 210. 
59. 392 U.S. at 211. INA § 242(b) governs the conduct of deportation proceedings. See 
generally IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, ch. 5; note 11 supra. 
60. 392 U.S. at 211. 
61. 392 U.S. at 213. 
62. 392 U.S. at 213 (quoting Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772, 777 (2d Cir. 1966)). The Court 
found further support for its holding in the colloquy on the floor of the House of Representatives, 
previously discussed in Foti, see note 46 supra and accompanying text, in which Congressman 
Walter stated that § 106(a) would apply to motions for discretionary relief made during the 
deportation hearing, '1ust as it would apply to any other issue brought up in deportation proceed-
ings." 392 U.S. at 215 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 12,728 (1959)) (emphasis added by the Supreme 
Court). The Court interpreted this statement to mean that "Congress quite deliberately re· 
stricted the application of § 106(a) to orders entered during proceedings conducted under 
§ 242(b), or directly challenging deportation orders themselves." 392 U.S. at 215. 
For a criticism of the result in Cheng Fan Kwok and a proposal for legislative reform, see 
Martin, Mandel, Cheng Fan Kwok, and Other Unappealing Cases: The Next Frontier of Immi-
gration Reform, 27 VA. J. INTL. L. 803, 807-09 (1987). 
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The Court's discussion qf the nature of final deportation orders in 
Cheng Fan Kwok, Giova, and Foti, along with the Court's references to 
congressional intent and sound judicial policy that support its discus-
sion, provides a useful backdrop to consideration of the various ap-
proaches to the section 106(a) timeliness issue developed by the courts 
of appeals. 
II. THE DIVISION IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS ON THE SECTION 
106(A) TIMELINESS QUESTION 
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach 
In 1964 the Supreme Court decided Giova v. Rosenberg, 63 holding 
that the courts of appeals had jurisdiction under section 106(a) to re-
view denials of motions to reopen. In 1965, the Ninth Circuit decided 
Bregman v. INS. 64 The Board of Immigration Appeals had rendered a 
final order of deportation against petitioner Jacob Bregman in April 
1963.65 Bregman twice moved to reopen the deportation proceedings, 
first in June 1963, and then again in August.66 The BIA denied both 
motions and the petitioner sought review of these denials and the de-
portation order in the court of appeals in November 1963. The court 
stated, without explaining its reasoning: 
It follows from Giova that if the motion to reopen before the Board is 
within six months of the final order of deportation and the petition to 
this court is within six months of the denial of the motion (as it was in 
this case), this court has jurisdiction to review both the final order of 
deportation and the denial of the motion to reopen. 67 
In subsequent cases, the rationale for the Bregman rule became 
clearer. For example, in Yamada v. INS, 68 the court considered 
whether it had jurisdiction to review the denial of a petition for classi-
fication as a first preference quota immigrant, 69 entered after deporta-
tion had been ordered. 70 In the course of its discussion the court 
compared such an order to a motion to reopen. The court noted that 
the denial of a motion to reopen is "directly linked with the original 
proceedings out of which the deportation order arose," and that there-
fore "it would be artificially literal . . . to attempt to distinguish, for 
63. 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (per curiam). 
64. 351 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1965). 
65. 351 F.2d at 402. 
66. 351 F.2d at 402. 
67. 351 F.2d at 402-03. 
68. 384 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1967). 
69. Under the first preference a total of 54,000 visas may be made available to qualified 
immigrants who are the unmarried sons and daughters of United States citizens. INA 
§ 203(a)(l), 8 u.s.c. § l 153(a)(l) (1982); see 1 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, 
§ 2.27b. 
70. The issue presented in Yamada was resolved by the Supreme Court in Cheng Fan Kwok 
v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968). See Part I.B.3 supra. 
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purposes of Section 106(a), between the final order proper and the de-
nial of a motion to reopen the proceedings."71 The court reasoned 
that the fact that a motion to reopen was "intimately and immediately 
associated with the principal order"72 argued for postponing the run-
ning of the six-month time limit while such an order was pending, 
assuming the six-month period was not allowed to expire before the 
motion was filed. 
The Ninth Circuit also argued that motions to reopen "are . . . 
protected from abuse by the regulations governing section 242(b) pro-
ceedings."73 It cited two regulatory requirements: (1) a motion to re-
open cannot be granted unless the evidence sought to be offered was 
not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the 
hearing; and (2) such a motion cannot be granted to allow an applica-
tion for any form of relief available in a section 242(b) proceeding if 
the alien's right to make such an application was fully explained to 
him at the hearing, unless the basis of the application arose after the 
hearing. 74 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the congressional policy 
of preventing repetitive, meritless appeals was already reflected in 
these regulations governing motions to reopen and reconsider, thus 
making a strict view of section 106(a)(l) unnecessary. 
The Yamada court pointed out that "Congress was ... concerned 
with the delay which resulted from multiple court proceedings"75 and 
cited the statement from the House Report that "the overall purpose 
of the new statute was 'to create a single, separate, statutory form of 
judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and exclu-
sion of aliens.' "76 The court concluded: 
It seems fair to assume from the statutory language, legislative history, 
and administrative context that Congress visualized a single administra-
tive proceeding in which all questions relating to an alien's deportation 
would be raised and resolved, followed by a single petition in a court of 
appeals for judicial review both of the ultimate question of deportation 
and of all of the subsidiary questions upon which it might depend.77 
Thus, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, postponing the running of the 
time limit "is in keeping with the intention of Congress to create a 
process in which there is a single judicial review of all questions relat-
71. 384 F.2d at 217 n.5 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 17-18, Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 
U.S. 18 (1964) (No. 23)); see also Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. at 217. 
72. 384 F.2d at 217 n.5 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 18, Giova). 
73. 384 F.2d at 217. 
74. 384 F.2d at 217-18; see also Mondragon v. INS, 625 F.2d 270, 272 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980). 
75. 384 F.2d at 218. 
76. 384 F.2d at 218 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1961) (emphasis 
added by the court)). 
77. 384 F.2d at 218; see also Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 215 (1968); Reyes v. 
INS, 571 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1978); Hyun Joon Chung v. INS, 720 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984). 
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ing to an alien's deportation."78 
B. The Third Circuit Approach 
The Third Circuit was first presented with an opportunity to de-
cide the section 106(a) timeliness issue in 1986. In Nocon v. INS, 79 the 
Nocons were found deportable on June 20, 1983.80 They appealed to 
the BIA, which affirmed the Immigration Judge's order on October 
11, 1984. On October 24, 1984, they filed a motion to reconsider with 
the BIA, which was denied on April 30, 1985. On July 10, 1985, the 
Nocons filed a petition for review in the court of appeals, seeking re-
view of both the order denying their motion to reconsider and the Oc-
tober 11, 1984 final deportation order.81 In deciding the timeliness 
issue, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit approach. 82 The court 
maintained that accepting the Ninth Circuit's analysis 
"would defeat the purpose of the statute," since the imposition of the six 
month period for seeking review of final deportation orders was designed 
to prevent undue delay in deportation once the alien's immigration sta-
tus had been decided. Enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Congress was especially sensitive to what it designated as "the growing 
frequency of judicial actions being instituted by undesirable aliens whose 
cases ... are brought solely for the purpose of preventing or delaying 
indefinitely their deportation from this country." Protracted litigation 
was viewed by Congress as a means of exploiting the judicial process. 
Thus, permitting aliens the benefit of additional time from their filing of 
motions to reopen or to reconsider would directly contravene Congres-
sional intent to prevent successive, piecemeal appeals from being used as 
a dilatory tactic to postpone the execution of deportation orders. More-
over, the six month appeal period [was] seen by Congress to be "suffi-
cient and far beyond the realms of any claim of unfairness, for an alien to 
determine whether he really has a case upon which he should seek judi-
cial review and to prepare [therefor]."83 
78. Hyun Joon Chung v. INS, 720 F.2d at 1474. In Hyun Joon Chung, the Ninth Circuit 
also held that when a motion to reopen or reconsider is filed, "an otherwise appealable final order 
becomes no longer appealable in this court until the motion is denied or the proceedings have 
been effectively terminated." 720 F.2d at 1474; see also Fayazi-Azad v. INS, 792 F.2d 873 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (following Hyun Joon Chung); note 128 infra. 
79. 789 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1986). 
80. 789 F.2d at 1030. 
81. 789 F.2d at 1030. 
82. 789 F.2d at 1031. 
83. 789 F.2d at 1033 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Garcia v. INS, 690 F.2d 349, 
350 (3d Cir. 1982), and H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., lst Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2950, 2967, 2973). 
The Nocon court also noted that ''the regulation governing motions to reopen or to reconsider 
appears to assume the continuing appealability of the original deportation order," 789 F.2d at 
1033 n.5, citing the requirement that motions "state whether the validity of the deportation order 
has been or is the subject of any judicial proceeding and, if so, the nature and date thereof, the 
court in which such proceeding took place or is pending, and its result or status," 789 F.2d at 
1033 n.5 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1987)). For a summary of Nocon, see 63 INTERPRETER 
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In light of these congressional concerns, the Nocon court con-
cluded that "strict compliance" with the statutory time limit was re-
quired. The court stated that under the statute petitions for review 
"must be filed within six months of the specific order sought to be re-
viewed. "84 Thus, the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider 
would not suspend the six-month limit for seeking review of the origi-
nal order. 85 
C. The "Good Faith" Approach of the Second and District of 
Columbia Circuits 
The compromise approach of the Second and District of Columbia 
Circuits is as yet relatively undeveloped. In the Second Circuit case 
Fu Chen Hsiung v. INS, 86 petitioners sought review of a deportation 
order issued in 1975 and affirmed by the BIA in December 1977, as 
well as review of three subsequent motions to reopen or reconsider. 
The court stated its general agreement with the Bregman rule, reason-
ing that "[ o ]therwise, the party faces the dilemma of taking his case to 
the BIA, possibly losing 'the chance to appeal, or appealing and 
preventing the BIA from acting by depriving it of jurisdiction. "87 
However, the court concluded: 
In light of our oft-expressed concern for dilatory tactics in immigration 
cases, . . . and on the facts of this case, where there have been three 
applications [to the BIA for discretionary relief], including an initial 
general one claiming insufficiency of evidence, we hold that it is not ap-
propriate to consider the merits of the deportation orders at this late 
hour.88 
This statement implies that the court will follow the Bregman rule 
except in cases involving repeated motions to reopen or reconsider 
filed for dilatory purposes. 
The District of Columbia Circuit has suggested a similar approach. 
In Attoh v. INS, 89 a deportation order had been issued against peti-
tioner on February 20, 1976. On February 25, 1976, petitioner moved 
to reopen and reconsider the denial of voluntary departure. The Im-
migration Judge denied this motion on December 17, 1976, and peti-
tioner appealed this denial to the BIA on December 30, 1976. That 
appeal was dismissed on November 23, 1977. Petitioner moved to re-
RELEASES 484-87 (1986). For a discussion of whether the filing of a motion to reopen affects the 
appealability of a final deportation order, see note 128 infra. 
84. 789 F.2d at 1033 (emphasis in original). 
85. 789 F.2d at 1033. 
86. No. 79-4012 {2d Cir. May 15, 1979) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file). 
87. No. 79-4012 {2d Cir. May 15, 1979). For a discussion of whether the BIA and court of 
appeals may have simultaneous jurisdiction, see note 128 infra. 
88. No. 79-4012 (2d Cir. May 15, 1979) (citations omitted). Thus, the only issue before the 
court was whether the BIA's denial of rehearing and reconsideration was an abuse of discretion. 
89. 606 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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open the BIA's decision by a petition filed February 28, 1978, and the 
Board denied this motion on May 26, 1978. A petition for judicial 
review was then filed on July 14, 1978.90 The court, citing the 
Bregman rule, saw no obstacle to reviewing the original deportation 
proceedings as well as the BIA's refusals to reopen the proceedings.91 
The court's adoption of Bregman, however, was qualified: 
While the Bregman rule might well be troubling in a case where there 
have been repeated and arguably frivolous motions to reopen or recon-
sider, the present situation reveals no hint of such dilatory tactics. In-
deed, there is every indication that petitioner moved from one 
procedural stage to the next with some dispatch. Between the February 
20, 1976 order and the filing of the instant petition he has had matters 
pending before the agency for all but about five months and 11 days. 
Thus for present purposes we are content to adopt Bregman only insofar 
as it implicitly recognizes that intervening good faith petitions for adminis-
trative relief may toll or suspend the running of the time limit. We save 
for another day a variety of related questions, among them whether and 
under what circumstances a petitioner can obtain a new six-month pe-
riod for each additional administrative maneuver.92 
III. THE Goon FAITH APPROACH 
Neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of section 
106 clearly addresses the section 106(a)(l) timeliness question. Yet, 
the legislative history does reveal that Congress was concerned with 
preventing repetitive appeals, deterring frivolous and dilatory appeals, 
and ensuring procedural fairness to aliens. This Part will demonstrate 
that the good faith approach best answers these concerns. In addition, 
this Part will argue that the good faith approach is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's treatment of section 106(a) jurisdiction, its interpre-
tation of time restrictions on judicial review of other administrative 
decisions, and its attempts to curb frivolous appeals by aliens. 
A. The Statutory Language 
Section 106(a)(l) provides that "a petition for review may be filed 
not later than six months from the date of the final deportation or-
der. "93 The courts of appeals agree that this language does not dispose 
90. 606 F.2d at 1275 & n.15. 
91. 606 F.2d at 1275 n.15. Since Attoh did not appeal his deportation order to the BIA, an 
issue coul<J have been raised as to whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The 
court did not address this point directly, but appears to have been influenced by the confused 
circumstances under which the immigration judge concluded that Attoh had waived appeal. See 
606 F.2d at 1275 & n.14. 
92. 606 F.2d at 1276 n.15 (emphasis added). 
93. 8 U.S.C. § l 105a(a)(l) (1982). There are no regulations interpreting the meaning of 
§ 106(a)(l). 8 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1987), which defines when "an order of deportation is final and 
subject to execution," refers to the appropriate time for execution of the deportation order by the 
INS, rather than to any question of§ 106(a) jurisdiction (e.g., § 243.3(a)(4) provides that a de-
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of the section 106(a) timeliness question.94 This is because section 
106(a)(l) does not specify the effect on the time for filing petitions for 
judicial review of reviewable orders entered after the final deportation 
order. When a motion to reopen or reconsider is filed within six 
months of the final deportation order and is denied, there are two pos-
sible ways of looking at the deportation order and order denying the 
motion. The Third Circuit characterizes the two orders as "indepen-
dently reviewable final orders,"95 and reasons that the time limit 
should run from each order separately. The Ninth Circuit, however, 
looks on the denial of the motion as an adjunct of the principal or-
der. 96 Under this view, there is, in effect, one "final deportation or-
der" from which the time limit can run. Final action on the later 
motion, therefore, gives rise to a new six-month period during which 
review of the principal order can be sought. 
B. The Legislative History 
1. Background 
Section 106 was enacted as a result of dissatisfaction on the part of 
Congress and the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations with sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions that allowed aliens greater rights of judi-
cial review.97 Historically, an alien could challenge a deportation 
order solely by habeas corpus proceedings, available only after the 
portation order "is final and subject to execution upon the date when any of the following occurs: 
... (4) A federal district or appellate court affirms an administrative order of deportation in a 
petition for review or habeas corpus action"). Cf Arch Mineral Corp. v. Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, 798 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1986) (term "final order" as used 
in the statute should be construed as distinct from the term "final decision" as used in the regula· 
tion, which refers to "the point at which the decision of the Department of Labor is no longer 
reviewable by any authority, judicial or administrative"); see also 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1987) (speci· 
fying when an order of deportation becomes final). 
94. See, e.g., Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1031 (3d Cir. 1986) ("this precise question is not 
covered by the Congressional statute"). 
95. 789 F.2d at 1033. The Third Circuit draws strength for this position from the fact that a 
court of appeals may in certain circumstances have jurisdiction to review a denial of a motion to 
reopen without having jurisdiction to review the underlying deportation order. 789 F.2d at 1031 • 
33; note 88 supra and accompanying text; 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, 
§ 8.9Ab, at 8-88. 
96. See, e.g., Yamada v. INS, 384 F.2d 214, 217 n.5 (9th Cir. 1967) (the denial ofa motion to 
reopen is "directly linked with the original proceedings out of which the deportation order 
arose," and therefore "it would be artificially literal ... to attempt to distinguish .•. between the 
final order proper and the denial of a motion to reopen the proceedings") (quoting Brief for 
Respondent at 17-18, Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (No. 23)). 
97. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General Lawrence E. Walsh to Congressman Emanuel 
Celler (Mar. 30, 1959), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1961); 
Letter from Deputy Attorney General Byron R. White to Congressman Emanuel Celler (Apr. 
18, 1961), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1961). See generally 
Note, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 
YALE L.J. 760 (1962). As early as 1952, there were proposals for the creation of a statutory form 
of judicial review of deportation orders. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION, WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME 169-70 (1953). 
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alien had been taken into custody.98 In 1954, an equally divided 
Supreme Court affirmed per curiam a holding by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit that deportation orders were reviewable in actions for 
declaratory judgment as well. 99 The following year the Court held 
that deportation orders could be judicially reviewed in actions for de-
claratory and injunctive relief under Section 10 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 100 
During this same period, there were several highly publicized cases 
of aliens who were able to evade deportation for long periods of time 
through protracted and repetitive litigation.101 As a result of frustra-
tion with this situation, the Attorney General proposed legislation. 
similar to section 106 in 1954.102 In 1956103 and 1957,104 President 
Eisenhower urged Congress to enact legislation "limiting and carefully 
defining the judicial process"105 with respect to deportation and exclu-
sion orders. 
When Congress finally enacted such legislation in 1961, its intent 
was to solve what it saw as the problem of "the growing frequency of 
98. Judicial Review of Deportation and Exclusion Orders: Hearings on H.R. 13311 Before 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1958) [hereinaf-
ter House Hearings] (statement of Malcolm Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 
Division). See also 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.2. 
99. Brownell v. Rubinstein, 346 U.S. 929 (1954). 
100. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955). The Justice Department contended: 
"There are several objections to the divergent methods of review. They lack uniformity. They 
are not mutually exclusive. They result in a delay in deporting an alien who should be deported. 
There is need for expedition, orderly venue, and the avoiding of repetitious court proceedings." 
House Hearings, supra note 98, at 23 (statement of Malcolm Anderson, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Criminal Division). 
101. See Letter of Attorney General William P. Rogers to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (Mar. 
25, 1959), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 565, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-11, 20-26 (1961). For example, William Heikkila, against whom deporta-
tion proceedings were begun in 1948, still had appeals pending at the time of his death in 1960. 
See H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-23 (1961). 
102. See Brief for Petitioner at 56-60, Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (No. 374). 
The Attorney General's proposed legislation would have placed jurisdiction in the district courts 
instead of the courts of appeals and had no provision for a time limit on filing petitions for 
judicial review. 
Whether jurisdiction should be placed in the district courts or in the courts of appeals contin-
ued to be a hotly debated issue during the years preceding the enactment of§ 106. See, e.g., H.R. 
REP. No. 423, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1959) (statement of John V. Lindsay); Senate Hearings, 
supra note 24, at 2 (testimony of Sen. Keating); 107 CONG. REC. 19,651 (1961) (statement of Sen. 
Keating) (endorsing proposed amendments to, among other things, lengthen the time limit to one 
year and provide for review in the district courts instead of the courts of appeals). 
103. See H.R. Doc. No. 329, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 565, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1961). The President said in part: 
[T]here is ... a significant need to strengthen the laws established for the wholesome pur-
pose of ridding the country of the relatively few aliens who have demonstrated their unfit-
ness to remain in our midst. Some of these persons have been found to be criminals of the 
lowest character, trafficking in murder, narcotics, and subversion. 
104. See H.R. Doc. No. 85, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957), quoted in H.R. REP. No. 565, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961). 
105. H.R. Doc. No. 85, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957). 
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judicial actions being instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases have 
no legal basis or merit, but which are brought solely for the purpose of 
preventing or delaying indefinitely their deportation from this coun-
try." 106 Although Congress did not explicitly make this division, its 
main concerns in enacting section 106 can be outlined as follows: (1) 
prevention of repetitious appeals; (2) prevention of frivolous appeals; 
and (3) prevention of delay in deportation of aliens as a result of (1) 
and (2). A fourth congressional concern was ensuring fairness to 
aliens facing deportation. This section argues that the above concerns 
are best met through the good faith approach. With respect to the 
running of the time limit on filing petitions for judicial review, the 
legislative history is ambiguous, although clearly at least some mem-
bers of Congress favored an interpretation of section 106(a)(l) that is 
consistent with the good faith approach. 
2. Congressional Intent Concerning the Running of the Section 
106(a)(l) Time Limit 
The running of the section 106(a)(l) time limit was discussed sev-
eral times during the debates and hearings leading up to the enactment 
of section 106. Unfortunately, it is impossible to discern any clear 
congressional intent on the timeliness question from this legislative 
history. The debate on H.R. 2807, a predecessor to the bill containing 
section 106, illustrates this ambiguity: 
Mr. Lindsay . ... As the gentleman knows, the proposed bill pro-
vides that a petition for review may be filed not later than 6 months from 
the date of the final deportation order or from the date of this act, which-
ever is the later. Do I understand that that means that the 6-month 
period will not benefit the alien until the exhaustion of all the adminis-
trative remedies of whatever sort? Is that correct? 
Mr. Walter. That is correct. 
Mr. Lindsay. The gentleman knows that the immigration regulations 
are complicated and subject to change by the executive branch. The ad-
ministrative review of orders of deportation sometimes can take different 
courses; so I would suggest that we make sure that the history of this is 
absolutely clear, that if there is any remedy on the administrative level 
left of any nature, that the deportation order will not be considered final. 
Mr. Walter. That is correct. The final order means the final adminis-
trative order. 107 
106. H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1961). 
107. 105 CONG. REc. 12,728 (1959). During the same debate, Congressmen Lindsay, 
Moore, and Walter further discuss this issue. However, this discussion is inconclusive: whereas 
Congressman Lindsay takes the view that the six-month period would not begin to run until after 
"the exhaustion of all administrative remedies," including a motion to reopen to apply for sus· 
pension of deportation, Congressman Moore appears to ftip-ftop on the issue, while Congressman 
Walter states that "the 6 months' period ... applies to the final administrative adjudication of the 
applications for suspension of deportation just as it would apply to any other issue brought up in 
deportation proceedings." Id. Walter's statement appears to refer to a request for suspension 
made to the immigration judge during the deportation hearing rather than a motion to reopen to 
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Although it is clear from the context108 that Lindsay is asking whether 
the running of the time limit can be delayed by the filing of requests 
for discretionary relief after the deportation hearing, Walter's response 
is ambiguous. He may simply be referring to the language of the bill, 
which requires the alien to exhaust the administrative remedies avail-
able to him "as of right"109 before filing a petition for judicial review. 
This latter provision refers to the requirement that the alien appeal the 
deportation order to the BIA before filing a petition for judicial re-
view; it does not require an alien to file a request for any optional relief 
such as a motion to reopen to apply for suspension of deportation. 
3. Prevention of Repetitive Appeals 
While the intent of Congress on the specific issue of the section 
106(a)(l) time limit is unclear, Congress did state that its overall pur-
pose in enacting section 106 was the creation of "a single, separate, 
statutory form of judicial review"110 of deportation orders. One of its 
major concerns was with "repetitive appeals to the busy and over-
worked courts."111 Congress intended to "curtail, if not to elimi-
nate"112 such repetitious litigation through the establishment of a 
"special statutory form of judicial review of deportation orders"113 
and through the provisions of section 106 that provided that an order 
of deportation could not be reviewed by a court if the alien had not 
exhausted his administrative remedies, if he had departed from the 
United States, or if the validity of the deportation order had been pre-
apply for suspension, so is not germane to the question Lindsay is asking. See also House Hear-
ings, supra note 98, at 15-16, 48-49, 57, 61-63; H.R. REP. No. 2478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 
(1958); 104 CONG. REc. 17,174-75 (1958). 
108. Congressman Lindsay gives the following explanation of his remarks: 
A moment ago I asked the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walter] whether or not it was 
correct to say that the 6 months period would not begin to run until after the exhaustion of 
all administrative remedies. In my question I assumed that suspension of deportation would 
be included as an administrative remedy. In other words, the question of deportability 
would be decided one way or the other. Assuming the alien was found to be deportable, 
then he goes back for further administrative relief. He asks for suspension of deportation 
proceedings. It may take a while before there is a determination on that question. 
105 CONG. REC. 12,728 (1959). 
109. H.R. 2807 (1959), reprinted in 105 CONG. REc. 12,723-24 (1959). 
110. H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961); but cf Senate Hearings, supra note 
25, at 4-5 (statement of Sen. Keating) (noting that "multiple court cases may not be avoided even 
by [the enactment of section 106] if steps are not taken to prevent multiple administrative deci-
sions involving the same alien"; giving the example of a deportation hearing followed by a mo-
tion to reopen and a decision on place of deportation). 
111. H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1 
(noting "the growing frequency of judicial actions" by aliens); id. at 2 ("repeated judicial reviews 
and appeals") (quoting H. Doc. 85, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)); id. at 7-11 (detailing the "chro-
nology of litigation in deportation proceedings against Carlos Marcello" and noting that Mar-
cello's court actions were "repetitious" and "multitudinous"). 
112. Id. at 14. 
113. Id. at 13. 
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viously determined in any judicial proceeding. 114 Thus, one of Con-
gress's main concerns was with establishing a procedure under which 
the courts would not be overburdened with repetitive actions brought 
by aliens challenging their deportation. 115 " 
The good faith approach addresses these concerns. Aliens who 
have filed nonfrivolous motions to reopen would be able to postpone 
bringing a petition for judicial review (and, indeed, could postpone the 
decision as to whether to petition for judicial review at all) until after 
their motion had been adjudicated. By contrast, under the Third Cir-
cuit's approach, if the motion had not been decided within six months 
of the deportation order, the alien would have to bring a petition for 
judicial review of the deportation order, and then a separate petition 
for review if the motion to reopen was denied. 
4. Prevention of Frivolous and Dilatory Appeals 
In enacting section 106, Congress also voiced a strong belief that 
many aliens were bringing frivolous actions challenging their deporta-
tion orders. For example, the report of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary accompanying H.R. 187 (a predecessor to the bill containing 
section 106)116 speaks of ''judicial actions being instituted by undesir-
able aliens whose cases have no legal basis or merit, but which are 
brought solely for the purpose of preventing or delaying indefinitely 
their deportation from this country."117 Congress hoped that the new 
judicial review procedures would curtail the number of frivolous and 
dilatory appeals. The good faith approach is consistent with these 
concerns, since it prevents aliens from using frivolous administrative 
114. See id. at 14-15; Part I.A supra. 
115. See, e.g., 107 CONG. REc. 12,177 (1961) ("The Federal courts which are very congested 
today will be relieved of a great burden, under this bill .... "). 
116. Predecessors to S. 2237, the bill containing § 106, were introduced during the 84th 
through 87th Congresses. See 102 CONG. REC. 2430 (1956); 102 CONG. REC. 2289 (1956); 103 
CONG. REC. 73 (1957); 103 CONG. REc. 255 (1957); 104 CONG. REC. 3493 (1957); 104 CONG. 
REC. 8632 (1958); 104 CONG. REC. 13,105 (1958); 105 CONG. REC. 855 (1959); 107 CONG. REC. 
39 (1961); 107 CONG. REc. 12,070 (1961). House Reports were issued on H.R. 13,311, H.R. 
2807, and H.R. 187, introduced during the 85th, 86th, and 87th Congresses, respectively. See 
H.R. REP. No. 2478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); H.R. REP. No. 423, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1959); H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). S. 2237 was reported in S. REP. No. 
646, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and H.R. 
CONF. REP. No. 1172, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). 
117. H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1961); see also id. at 2 ("frivolous claims 
of impropriety in the deportation proceedings"); id. ("Many of these claims have constituted 
unjustified attacks upon the constitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but no 
such attacks have ever been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States."); id. ("appeals 
for the sole purpose of delaying their justified expulsion from this country") (quoting H. Doc. 85, 
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957)); id. ("cases brought for purposes of delay") (quoting H. Doc. 85, 
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1957)); id. at 7 ("under the present laws racketeers and other un-
desirables can frustrate deportation by repeated dilatory actions") (quoting Letter from Attorney 
General William P. Rogers to Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (Mar. 25, 1959)); id. at 12-13 (discussing 
examples of frivolous appeals). 
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motions to delay the running of the time limit on filing petitions for 
judicial review of final deportation orders. The Ninth Circuit ap-
proach, however, fails to meet these concerns. By allowing the filing 
of any motion to reopen or reconsider, no matter how groundless, to 
delay the time period for appealing the final deportation order, it ap-
pears to encourage the filing of frivolous motions merely to delay 
deportation. 
5. Fairness to Aliens 
Congress was also concerned with charges by critics of the prede-
cessors to the bill containing section 106 that the rights of aliens to 
judicial review might be impeded or prematurely cut off by the pro-
posed review procedure.118 As a result, the proposed time limit was 
lengthened from 60 days119 to six months and the use of typewritten 
briefs in the courts of appeals was allowed.120 In the debates on the 
bill, Congressman Walter emphasized that "[t]his bill does not prevent 
any alien from seeking judicial review of administrative orders of de-
portation .... It sets up a single, expeditious, and fair method of judi-
cial review .... " 121 In particular, Congress felt that providing for 
judicial review in the courts of appeals gave the alien "greater rights, 
greater security, and more assurance of a close study of his case by 
experienced judges."122 The good faith approach is consistent with 
this emphasis on fairness because it ensures that aliens who are pursu-
ing administrative motions in good faith will not have their right to 
judicial review of their deportation order cut off. 
C. Judicial Economy and the Review of Administrative Orders 
The good faith approach postpones the running of the time limit 
for filing a petition for judicial review of a deportation order while 
motions to reopen or reconsider, made in good faith and not simply 
for purposes of delay, are pending. Such an approach addresses the 
judicial economy concerns animating both the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of section 106(a) jurisdiction and its treatment of appellate 
118. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 98, at 66-67 (statement by Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom). 
119. See H.R. 12,487, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). 
120. See H.R. 13,311, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 
98, at 1-3; House Hearings, supra note 97, at 15 (testimony of Rep. Celler); H.R. REP. No. 565, 
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1961); 105 CONG. REC. 12,728 (1959) (statement of Rep. Moore) (six 
months is greatly in excess of the usual period for reviewing administrative determinations). 
121. 107 CONG. REC. 12,175 (1961) (emphasis added). 
122. H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1961); see also id. at 14-15 ("[T]he alien is 
guaranteed the right to bring an action in a court most convenient to him."); id. at 15 (alien is 
"guaranteed a trial de novo if he raises a substantial claim of U.S. nationality"); id. at 15 (validity 
of a deportation order may be challenged in a criminal proceeding brought against an alien under 
§ 242(d) or (e) of the INA); id. at 15 (right to habeas corpus review preserved to an alien in 
custody under a deportation order). 
1014 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:990 
review of administrative orders in nonimmigration contexts. In con-
trast, the approach of the Third Circuit, which treats the initial depor-
tation order and subsequent motions to reopen or reconsider as 
separate and distinct orders, frustrates judicial economy by requiring a 
bifurcated review process in many cases. 
1. The Consistency of the Good Faith Approach with Supreme Court 
Interpretation of Section 106(a) 
The good faith approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the section 106(a) jurisdiction of the courts of ap-
peals.123 The Court has described motions to reopen or reconsider as 
being " 'intimately and immediately associated' with the final orders 
they seek to challenge."124 As the Court explained in Cheng Fan 
Kwok, such motions are essentially continuations of the proceeding 
that begins with a section 242(b) hearing before an immigration 
judge.125 Thus, although "[a]n essential premise of Foti was ... that 
the application of § 106(a) had been limited to orders 'made during 
the same proceedings in which deportability is determined,' " 126 "[t]he 
result in Giova [holding that denials of motions to reopen were review-
able under § 106(a)] was ... a logical concomitant of the construction 
of § 106(a) reached in Foti; it did not, explicitly or by implication, 
broaden that construction."121 
Given that motions to reopen or reconsider are continuations of 
the deportation proceeding, it is logical to postpone the running of the 
time limit for filing a petition for judicial review until the motion is 
decided, at least where such motions are not filed simply for purposes 
of delay .12s Since review of the denial of discretionary relief is closely 
123. See Part I.B supra. 
124. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 217 (1968) (quoting Brieffor Respondent at 53, 
Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217 (1963) (No. 28)); see also note 56 supra and accompanying text. 
125. E.g., 392 U.S. at 216 ("We hold that the judicial review provisions of§ 106(a) embrace 
only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under§ 242(b), including those 
determinations made incident to a motion to reopen such proceedings.") (emphasis added). 
126. 392 U.S. at 217 (quoting Foti, 375 U.S. at 224). 
127. 392 U.S. at 217; see also 392 U.S. at 217 & n.19 ("petitions to reopen deportation pro· 
ceedings are governed by the regulations applicable to the deportation proceeding itself") (citing 
8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1968)). 
128. A separate issue is whether the filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider deprives the 
court of appeals of jurisdiction to review the final deportation order while the motion remains 
unadjudicated. In a recent Ninth Circuit case, Fayazi-Azad v. INS, 792 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 
1986), the petitioner filed a motion to reopen in December 1984 and a petition for review of the 
final deportation order in May 1985. At the time he filed his petition for review, the motion had 
not yet been adjudicated by the BIA. In dismissing the petition, the court held that "[w]here a 
petitioner elects to file a motion to reopen before seeking judicial review, the 'otherwise appeala-
ble final order becomes no longer appealable in this court until the motion is denied or the 
proceedings have been effectively terminated.'" 792 F.2d at 874 (quoting Hyun Joon Chung v. 
INS, 720 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984)) (emphasis in origi· 
nal). Other circuits have taken sharply differing positions on this issue. The Third Circuit has 
suggested that in such a situation, the BIA and the court of appeals would have simultaneous 
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associated with review of the original order, considerations of judicial 
economy suggest that both determinations should be made by the 
same court at the same time. 129 In addition, consideration of the 
jurisdiction. See Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit has 
stated that when a judicial appeal is taken, the BIA is deprived of jurisdiction. See Fu Chen 
Hsiung v. INS, No. 79-4012 (2d Cir. May 15, 1979). 
While a full discussion of this jurisdictional issue is beyond the scope of this Note, the Third 
Circuit's position - that jurisdiction may be simultaneous - appears to be in accord with long-
standing practice. See, e.g. Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 84 ("[C]ourt actions often take place 
contemporaneously with a motion to reopen before the Board."); see also 63 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 658 (1986) (characterizing the Fayazi-Azad holding as "novel"); 2 C. GORDON & H. 
ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.4a, at 8-24; cf 104 CONG. REc. 17,175 (1958) (debate on a prede-
cessor to the bill that contained section 106) (statement of Rep. Keating) (urging "contempora-
neous court consideration of deportability and administrative application for relief"); Mortazavi 
v. INS, 719 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1983) (at request of petitioner, petition to review the order of 
deportation held in abeyance awaiting disposition of motion to reopen). In addition, the regula-
tions governing motions to reopen appear to assume that administrative and court actions may 
be carried on simultaneously. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1987) (motion must "state whether the 
validity of the deportation order has been or is the subject of any judicial proceeding"); Nocon, 
789 F.2d at 1033 n.5. 
The Ninth Circuit's position in Fayazi-Azad, however, is consistent with the Bregman rule. 
See Fayazi-Azad, 192 F.2d at 874 ("Because the time for filing a petition for judicial review on 
the underlying order does not begin to run until the agency acts upon the motion to reopen, it is 
not necessary for a petitioner to file a protective appeal from the BIA's original decision .... "). 
In addition, it may be motivated by a desire to minimize interference in the administrative pro-
cess. Cf Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) (referring to "the 
general notion that an administrative order is not 'final,' for the purposes of judicial review, until 
outstanding petitions for reconsideration have been disposed of") (emphasis in original), dis-
cussed in 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 26:12, at 469-70 (2d ed. 1983); ICC 
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 107 S. Ct. 2360, 2368-69 (1987), discussed in note 135 
infra and accompanying text; Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1985) (alien prof-
fering new evidence was required to file a motion to reopen with the BIA; that procedure avoids 
interference with agency's processes). However, the Ninth Circuit's position fails to take into 
account the possibility that the alien will be unable to obtain a stay of deportation and will be 
deported while waiting for his motion to be adjudicated. See note 36 supra. For example, in 
Fayazi-Azad, the court stayed its mandate for 30 days "[i]n order to afford Fayazi-Azad the 
opportunity to seek a stay of deportation from the BIA pending resolution of his motion to 
reopen." 792 F.2d at 874. The court did not explain what it thought Fayazi-Azad's appropriate 
course of action should be if the BIA refused to grant a stay. Although there are tactics an alien 
can use to attempt to stay in the country despite his failure to obtain an administrative stay, see 
note 151 infra, it seems inappropriate to force an alien to choose between engaging in expensive 
and possibly fruitless litigation, and losing his right to judicial review of his deportation order. 
The Ninth Circuit has on occasion issued stays of deportation to prevent aliens from being 
deported before their motion is adjudicated. In Dhangu v. INS, 812 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 
1987), the court stayed its mandate "for such time as is necessary for disposition of [the motion 
to reopen] currently pending before the BIA." In Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1374 
(9th Cir. 1985), the court ordered a stay of deportation for 60 days to allow the petitioner to file a 
motion to reopen and "for such further time as is necessary for the disposition of the motion by 
the BIA." However, this approach is of doubtful validity given the lack of any basis in the 
statute or the regulations for the granting of a stay by the court of appeals except during the 
pendency of a petition for judicial review. See Larimi v. INS, 782 F.2d 1494, 1497 (9th Cir. 
1986) ("There is no justification for the courts to create any new rights to a stay as a matter of 
federal common law.") (purporting to distinguish Roque-Carranza). Thus, this does not appear 
to be a viable way to solve the difficulties created by the Fayazi-Azad decision. 
129. Cf Brief for Respondent at 18-21, Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (No. 23) 
(discussing the desirability of the denial of a motion to reopen and the deportation order being 
reviewed together in the court of appeals); notes 49, 56, & 69-72 supra and accompanying text. 
Concededly, even under the Third Circuit approach, if the petition for review of the deportation 
order were still pending at the time the motion was decided, it would be open to the alien to file a 
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alien's claims in a motion to reopen or reconsider by the BIA will 
sometimes eliminate the need for judicial review. 130 As the Court em-
phasized in Fotl the major purpose behind section 106(a) was to cre-
ate an expeditious form of judicial review that would prevent aliens 
from tying up the courts with repeated meritless appeals.131 Postpon-
ing the running of the time limit only where aliens pursue motions to 
reopen or reconsider on a nonfrivolous basis satisfies both of Con-
gress's main concerns: preventing repeated recourse to the courts and 
expediting the departure of aliens with no arguable basis for extending 
their stay.132 
2. Judicial Review of Nonimmigration Administrative Decisions 
In a majority of cases involving appellate review of administrative 
orders, courts have held that, where the applicable statute and regula-
tions are silent, the timely filing of a motion to reconsider or similar 
motions suspends the time for filing a petition for judicial review. 133 
second petition for review of the motion and then move to consolidate the two petitions. See 63 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 487, 659 (1986). However, there would be many cases in which the 
two orders would be reviewed separately because the motion was still pending at the time the 
deportation. order was reviewed. 
In addition to it being more efficient to review both orders at the same time, it would seem to 
be more conceptually practical as well, especially in the case of motions to reconsider. One 
commentator on Nocon has written: 
If a proper motion to reconsider had been filed, requiring adjudication of the motion on 
its merits, the Board would have had to review its original decision before it could determine 
the merits of the motion to reconsider. (If, for example, the Board were to sustain a depor-
tation order on a ground not authorized by the statute, and this were the basis of a motion to 
reconsider, it is difficult to see how the Board could consider the merits of that motion 
without at least having recourse to its original decision). Consequently, on judicial review of 
the Board's order denying the motion to reconsider, the reviewing court would also have to 
have recourse to the Board's original order, even though that order was entered more than 
six months before the petition for review was filed. 
63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 487 (1986). 
130. Legomsky, supra note 38, at 1332. Cf. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 
U.S. 56, 59 (1982) (per curiam) ("in order to prevent unnecessary appellate review," district 
court under FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) has "authority to entertain a timely motion to alter or 
amend the judgment under Rule 59, even after a notice of appeal ha[s] been filed"); 28 U.S.C.A. 
FED. R. APP. P. 4 (West 1980) notes of advisory committee on appelJate rules (1979 Amend-
ment; Note to Subdivision (a)(4)) ("[I]t would be undesirable to proceed with the appeal while 
the district court has before it a motion the granting of which would vacate or alter the judgment 
appealed from."). 
131. 375 U.S. at 224. 
132. As noted by the Court in Foti, a major concern of Congress in enacting § 106 was the 
prevention of exploitation of the judicial process by aliens ''whose cases have no legal basis or 
merit." 375 U.S. at 225 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1961)) (emphasis 
added); see also Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978) ("Congress was primarily concerned 
with the filing of repetitive petitions for review and with frivolous claims of impropriety in the 
deportation proceedings."); Parts 111.B.3 & 111.B.4 supra. 
133. Arch Mineral Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 798 F.2d 
215, 218 (7th Cir. 1986). For examples of cases holding that the timely filing of the motion 
suspends the running of the time limit, see C.O.D.E., Inc. v. ICC, 768 F.2d 1210, 1211-12 (10th 
Cir. 1985); Nordell v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 47, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984); American Trucking Assns. 
v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1146, 1148 & n.• (D.C. Cir. 1983); B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 1112, 
1114-15 (8th Cir. 1977); Tiger Intl., Inc. v. CAB, 554 F.2d 926, 931 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
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These courts base their result on considerations of judicial economy, 
reasoning that "[i]t is obviously wasteful of the resources of the courts 
to burden them with objections to administrative action which may be 
obviated by agency action on reconsideration."134 
Recently the Supreme Court adopted the majority approach in a 
case involving review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. The Court held that "[w]hile the petition for review was filed 
more than 60 days after that order was served, we conclude that it was 
nonetheless effective, because the timely petition for administrative re-
consideration stayed the running of the ... limitation period until the 
petition had been acted upon by the Commission."135 This interpreta-
tion is consistent with this Note's approach to the section 106(a) time-
liness question. 
434 U.S. 975 (1977); Tullman v. Udall, 324 F.2d 411, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1963), revd. on other 
grounds, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Samuel B. Franklin & Co. v. SEC, 290 F.2d 719, 723-24 (9th Cir.) 
(en bane), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961); Montship Lines v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 
147, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 1960). For exam-
ples of cases taking the opposite view, see Selco Supply Co. v. United States EPA, 632 F.2d 863, 
865 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Nappi v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 282, 
283-84 (1972). 
134. Arch Mineral Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 798 F.2d 
215, 219 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Nordell v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 47, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[O]ur 
view of what constitutes 'final action' by the EEOC will promote judicial economy by encourag-
ing employees to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit."). 
Courts have also drawn an analogy between filing motions to reopen or reconsider in the 
context of judicial review of administrative orders and the operation of certain rules governing 
review of federal court decisions. See, e.g., Nordell, 749 F.2d at 48-49 ("a timely request for 
judicial reconsideration automatically extends the time for filing a notice of appeal or a petition 
for writ of certiorari"); Arch Mineral Corp., 798 F.2d at 218 ("[V]arious federal rules of appellate 
procedure that provide for the suspension of the time for filing an appeal while particular mo-
tions in the nature of reconsideration are pending 1n the lower court ..• do not govern the matter 
before us although they are suggestive."). See generally Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Elec. 
Co., 318 U.S. 203 (1943) (when a motion is made under Federal Rule 52(b) to amend and supple-
ment the findings, the time for taking an appeal from the judgment runs from the date of the 
order disposing of the motion); FED. R. CIV. P. 74(a) (full time for appeal from the magistrate's 
judgment starts to run anew from entry of order disposing of certain postjudgment motions); 
Foti v. INS, 308 F.2d 779, 793 (2d Cir. 1962) (comparing applications for discretionary reliefin 
deportation cases to postjudgment motions in civil cases) (dissenting opinion), revd., 375 U.S. 217 
(1963); Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 217 (1968) (comparing motions to reopen to 
motions for rehearing or reconsideration). FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) provides, in part: 
( 4) If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district 
court by any party: (i) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (ii) under Rule 52(b) to amend or 
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted; (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (iv) 
under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of 
the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
See also Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) (under 
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4), when a premature notice of appeal is filed, the court of appeals lacks 
jurisdiction to act). 
135. ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 107 S. Ct. 2360, 2368 (1987). The Court did 
not rely on any policy arguments, cf. note 134 supra and accompanying text, but rather stated 
that the filing of the petition for reconsideration rendered the underlying order "nonfinal." 107 
S. Ct. at 2368-69. For the reasons discussed in note 128 supra, this Note argues that with respect 
to deportation orders, the question of the running of the time limit and the question offinality for 
purposes of judicial review should be considered separately. 
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D. Frivolous Appeals by Aliens 
The good faith approach not only satisfies judicial economy con-
cerns, but also lessens the incentive to file frivolous motions. An alien 
who knows that the pendency of a frivolous motion will not preserve 
her right to review of the original order will have less incentive to file 
the motion.136 To the extent that an alien is pursuing administrative 
motions in good faith, the good faith approach makes judicial inter-
vention unnecessary until the administrative process is complete.137 
This section first discusses the Supreme Court's condemnation of friv-
olous appeals by aliens. It then argues that the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach to the section 106(a) timeliness question fails to address this 
problem. The Third Circuit's approach, on the other hand, is overin-
clusive in that it sacrifices judicial economy concerns even in cases in 
which aliens are pursuing administrative remedies in a nonfrivolous 
manner. 
1. Rios-Pineda and Supreme Court Treatment of Frivolous Appeals 
The good faith approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
136. It could be argued that for aliens who have no realistic hope of staying in the country 
permanently, and are merely attempting to postpone their ultimate departure with frivolous or 
dilatory motions to reopen or reconsider, the possibility of losing the right to judicial review of 
their deportation order will have little or no deterrent effect. This is because such aliens could 
still file a petition for review of the denial of their motion and receive an automatic stay under 
§ 106(a)(3). However, in such cases the good faith approach would give added flexibility to 
courts and to INS officials who may wish to move such aliens out of the country. For example, 
the INS could move for summary affirmance or to dissolve the automatic stay. See Legomsky, 
supra note 38, at 1336. Under the good faith approach the argument for such a motion would 
carry added weight. The government could argue that the alien had already lost his right to 
review of the deportation order through the filing of frivolous motions and that a petition for 
review of the denial of a frivolous motion was likewise frivolous. One practical problem with this 
procedure is that the alien must be given the opportunity to respond to the motion. If the motion 
is denied, the net effect may be to set back the briefing schedule and increase the delay. See id. at 
1336 & nn. 248-49; 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.9Af, at 8·94.10 to -94.11. 
However, as outlined above, it appears likely that the good faith approach would make it easier 
for courts to grant such motions. 
Another avenue for decreasing the frequency of frivolous appeals is the use of sanctions. The 
BIA has the power to impose sanctions on attorneys who file frivolous motions to reopen or 
reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(d)(3) (1987); Note, Frivolous Appeals vs. Zealous Representation in 
Immigration Cases: Standards, Trends, and Due Process Concerns, 1 GEO. IMM. L.J. 291, 293 
(1986). Courts could also more frequently sanction attorneys who bring frivolous § 106(a) peti-
tions. See Legomsky, supra note 38, at 1336; 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, 
§ 8.9Af, at 8-94.11 & nn.86-88. 
One commentator has suggested that § 106(c) be amended to allow appeals and at least some 
motions to reopen to be brought after the alien has left the country. At the same time, most 
aliens would be required to leave after losing before the BIA, or perhaps even after losing before 
the immigration judge. This reform would apparently eliminate the opportunity to file most 
dilatory appeals and motions. See Martin, supra note 62, at 815-19. 
137. An exception would be the case where the alien is unable to obtain an administrative 
stay of deportation while her motion is pending before the BIA. In that case she might resort to 
filing a § 106(a) petition of her deportation order in order to obtain an automatic stay of deporta-
tion under § 106(a)(3). 
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treatment of frivolous appeals by aliens. In INS v. Rios-Pineda, 138 the 
Court voiced· its strong disapproval of aliens who attempt to obtain 
benefits under the immigration laws after delaying their departure 
through frivolous appeals. 
In Rios-Pineda, the Court unanimously upheld a BIA discretion-
ary denial of a motion to reopen for suspension of deportation pur-
poses. The Court emphasized the discretionary nature of the relief 
requested. 139 In discussing the reasons justifying the Board's denial of 
the motion, the Court made it clear that it was evaluating the BIA's 
decision in light of the facts of the case, 140 which in its view pointed to 
both frivolous appeals and flagrant violations of the immigration laws: 
First, although by the time the BIA denied the motion, respondents 
had been in this country for seven years, that was not the case when 
suspension of deportation was first denied; the seven years accrued dur-
ing the pendency of respondents' appeals. The BIA noted that respon-
138. 471 U.S. 444 (1985). 
139. 471 U.S. at 449. 
140. Respondents in Rios-Pineda, husband and wife, were Mexican citizens. The husband 
entered the United States illegally in 1972, was apprehended by the INS, and was permitted to 
leave the country voluntarily in early 1974 without the institution of deportation proceedings. 
Two months later, the couple entered the United States with the assistance of a professional 
smuggler. The husband was again apprehended by the INS in 1978 and was again granted per-
mission to return voluntarily to Mexico without the institution of deportation proceedings. He 
was granted two extensions of time to depart, but failed to leave. The INS then started deporta-
tion proceedings against both husband and wife. By that time they had a child who, born in the 
United States, was a U.S. citizen. At the deportation hearing held in December 1978, respon-
dents conceded deportability, and applied for suspension of deportation under INA § 244(a). See 
8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1982 & Supp. 1984) (To be eligible for suspension of deportation, the alien must 
have been physically present in the United States for seven years, be of good moral character, and 
demonstrate that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien, or the alien's spouse, 
parent, or child, who is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.). 
The Immigration Judge found them ineligible under § 244(a) because they had not been in 
the country for the required seven years, and ordered them deported. On appeal to the BIA, they 
raised a number of arguments challenging the deportation order: that the immigration judge 
should have given them Miranda warnings, that their deportation would be an unlawful de facto 
deportation of their citizen child, and that the husband should have been considered present in 
the U.S. since his 1972 entry. The BIA rejected the arguments and dismissed the appeal. 
In July 1980, the aliens filed a petition for review in the court of appeals, raising substantially 
the same claims the BIA had rejected. In March 1982, 15 months after the briefs were filed, the 
court of appeals reversed. Rios-Pineda v. United States Dept. of Justice, 673 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 
1982). The court of appeals concluded that the required presence for seven years had accrued 
during the pendency of the appeals, and directed the BIA to allow respondents 60 days to file a 
motion to reopen. During the pendency of the appeals, the couple had a second child. 
Respondents filed a motion to reopen with the BIA and requested suspension of deportation, 
alleging that deportation would result in extreme hardship to them and their children. The BIA 
denied the motion to reopen, holding, among other things, that discretionary relief was unwar-
ranted because the additional facts - continuous physical presence for seven years and an addi-
tional child - were available only because respondents had delayed deportation through 
frivolous appeals. The BIA also held that a favorable exercise of discretion was unwarranted 
because of respondents' blatant disregard for the immigration laws. 
Respondents again filed a petition for review and the court of appeals again reversed and 
directed the BIA to grant the motion to reopen. Rios-Pineda v. United States Dept. of Justice, 
720 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1983). The Eighth Circuit also held that respondents' prior appeals were 
not frivolous. See 471 U.S. at 446-48; 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 468-70 (1985). 
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dents' issues on appeals were without merit and held that the 7-year 
requirement satisfied in this manner should not be recognized. In our 
view, it did not exceed its discretion in doing so . 
. . . No substance was found in any of the points raised on appeal, in 
and of themselves, and we agree with the BIA that they were without 
merit. The purpose of an appeal is to correct legal errors which occurred 
at the initial determination of deportability; it is not to permit an indefi-
nite stalling of physical departure in the hope of eventually satisfying 
legal prerequisites. One illegally present in the United States who wishes 
to remain already has a substantial incentive to prolong litigation in or-
der to delay physical deportation for as long as possible. The Attorney 
General can, in exercising his discretion, legitimately avoid creating a 
further incentive for stalling by refusing to reopen suspension proceed-
ings for those who became eligible for such suspension only because of 
the passage of time while their meritless appeals dragged on. 
Second, we are sure that the Attorney General did not abuse his dis-
cretion in denying reopening based on respondents' flagrant violation of 
the federal law in entering the United States, as well as respondent hus-
band's willful failure to depart voluntarily after his request to do so was 
honored by the INS.141 
Although in Rios-Pineda it was the aliens' appeals to the BIA and the 
court of appeals that were frivolous, rather than their motions to re-
open, it seems likely that the Court would similarly disapprove of friv-
olous motions to reopen.142 The good faith approach advocated in this 
Note, under which aliens are able to delay the filing of petitions for 
judicial review only when their motions to reopen are nonfrivolous, 
satisfies these concerns. 
2. The Problem of Frivolous Appeals 
Rios-Pineda, the legislative history of section 106, 143 and Supreme 
141. 471 U.S. at 449-51 (footnote and citations omitted). For a criticism of the Court's dis-
cussion offrivolous appeals, see 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 474 (1985) (noting that "[t]he ques-
tion whether an appeal is 'frivolous' does not necessarily depend on its success"). See gellera/ly 
Note, supra note 136. 
In its discussion, the Court emphasized that the Attorney General and INS "confront an 
onerous task" in administering the immigration laws, "even without the addition of judicially 
augmented incentives to take meritless appeals ... and undertake other conduct solely to drag 
out the deportation process." 471 U.S. at 450-51. For the view that illegal aliens are seen by the 
Court as "uninvited guests, intruders, trespassers, law breakers," see Aleinikolf, Good Aliens, 
Bad Alie11S alld the Supreme Court, 9 DEF. ALIEN 46, 47 (1987). 
142. In its discussion of dilatory litigation, the Court cited cases in which aliens had filed 
dilatory or frivolous motions to reopen or reconsider. See Hibbert v. INS, 554 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 
1977), cited ill Rios-Pilleda, 471 U.S. at 450; Sung Ja Oum v. INS, 613 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1980), 
cited ill Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 450. 
At least one court has applied the rationale of Rios-Pineda in a context other than a request 
for suspension of deportation. See Torres-Hernandez v. INS, 812 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 
1987) (rationale of Rios-Pineda is applicable to the accrual of the seven-year period for discre-
tionary relief from deportation for permanent resident aliens under INA § 212(c)). 
143. See Part III.B supra. 
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Court interpretation of the INA 144 all condemn frivolous appeals by 
aliens. However, both the Third Circuit approach and the Ninth Cir-
cuit approach are unsatisfactory ways of dealing with the possibility of 
frivolous or dilatory tactics on the part of aliens under deportation 
orders. The good faith approach is the best way to balance the com-
peting concerns of judicial economy and discouraging dilatory tactics 
by aliens. 
a. The Ninth Circuit's approach. The Ninth Circuit has primarily 
argued that its position satisfies congressional intent to limit the 
number of judicial appeals brought by aliens under deportation or-
ders.145 However, it has also argued that the bringing of motions to 
reopen and reconsider is "protected from abuse by the regulations gov-
erning section 242(b) proceedings."146 Under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, a motion 
to reopen cannot be granted unless the "evidence sought to be offered 
is material and was not available and could not have been discovered 
or presented at the former hearing"147 and such a motion cannot be 
granted to allow an application "for any form of discretionary relief 
... if ... the alien's right to apply for such relief was fully explained to 
him and an opportunity to apply therefor was afforded him at the for-
mer hearing unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances 
which have arisen subsequent to the hearing."148 Yet these regula-
tions speak only to the conditions for granting relief. They do not 
prevent aliens from bringing frivolous motions that fail to meet the 
above requirements or any others that are applicable. 
It might be argued that these concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit 
approach are met by the disincentive effect of the possibility that an 
alien will be deported while waiting for his motion to be adjudicated 
by the BIA.149 The regulations provide that "[t]he filing of a motion 
144. See Part III.D.1 supra. 
145. See, e.g., Yamada v. INS, 384 F.2d 214, 218 (9th Cir. 1967). 
146. Yamada, 384 F.2d at 217; see also notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text. 
147. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987), discussed in Yamada, 384 F.2d at 217; see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 
(1987). 
148. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987), discussed in Yamada, 384 F.2d at 217-18; see also 8 C.F.R. 
§ 242.22 (1987); Mondragon v. INS, 625 F.2d 270, 272 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980). 
149. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1987) provides that "[a]ny departure from the United States of a person 
who is the subject of deportation proceedings occurring after the making of a motion to reopen or 
a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion." It would appear that 
under this regulation an alien's deportation constitutes a constructive withdrawal of a pending 
motion to reopen or reconsider. See, e.g., Reid v. INS, 766 F.2d 113, 116 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985); cf. 
Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983) (had 
petitioner been deported during pendency of appeal to BIA of denial of motion to reopen, appeal 
would have been moot). However, at least one court has held that a motion to reopen may be 
brought after the alien has been deported ifthe deportation was not "legally executed." Estrada-
Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1981); see also note 27 supra (discussing the Mendez 
exception); Martin, supra note 62, at 816-17 & n.57; Reid, 766 F.2d at 116 n.9 (suggesting that 
judicial review of a motion to reopen may be available if the alien's departure from the country 
before the motion was adjudicated was not voluntary). In addition, the Reid court noted the 
possibility that "in extraordinary cases relief in the nature of a stay might be available in the 
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to reopen or a motion to recon~ider shall not serve to stay the execu-
tion of any decision made in the case."150 Deportation may proceed 
unless a stay is granted by the district director, the immigration judge, 
or the BIA. 151 This decreases the incentive to file frivolous motions. 
However, this factor is at least partially negated by the possibility of 
judicial review of the immigration judge or BIA's stay denial in United 
States district court. 152 In any case, it appears that the possibility of 
being deported while their motion to reopen is pending has not been a 
sufficient deterrent to prevent many aliens from bringing frivolous or 
dilatory motions.153 · 
b. The Third Circuit's approach. The Third Circuit asserts that 
its interpretation of section 106(a) is necessary in order to carry out 
"Congressional intent to prevent successive, piecemeal appeals from 
being used as a dilatory tactic to postpone the execution of deportation 
court of appeals pursuant to the All Writs Act," 766 F.2d at 116 n.9, which empowers federal 
courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of Jaw," 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). 
150. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1987). 
151. See id. Aliens have argued that the denial ofa stay by the BIA before deciding a motion 
to reopen or reconsider in effect denies the motion. Several circuits have rejected petitions for 
review in such situations on the ground that the denial of a stay is not a final deportation order. 
See, e.g., Reyes v. INS, 571 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1978); Reid v. INS, 766 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985); 
Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983). How-
ever, one court has declared that "we may treat the Board's unjustified failure to act within a 
reasonable period as an effective denial of the motion to reopen." Dabone v. Kam, 763 F.2d 593, 
597 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985), quoted in 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.9Ab, at 8-
91; cf. Bothyo v. INS, 783 F.2d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing Dabone v. Karn as habeas 
corpus review of exclusion, finding review precluded because administrative remedies were not 
exhausted, finding delay was not unreasonable, finding it unnecessary to decide "under what 
circumstances inaction by the Board may confer jurisdiction upon this Court"), Denial of a stay 
or inaction on a request for a stay can be challenged in district court. See 2 C. GORDON & H. 
ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 8.9Ab, at 8-90 n.52a; Dhangu v. INS, 812 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
For a discussion of whether a petition for judicial review may be brought after an alien has 
been deported, see note 36 supra. To the extent that an alien risks losing his right to judicial 
review by being deported, that would provide a further disincentive to the bringing of frivolous 
motions. 
152. See 8 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 9, § 62.08[3][b], at 62-34 to -36; see, 
e.g., Lopez-Alegria v. Ilchert, 632 F. Supp. 932, 935 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (district court has habeas 
jurisdiction to review district director's denial of stay while motion to reopen is pending); Maldo-
nado de Vasquez v. Ilchert, 614 F. Supp. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (same); see also Dhangu v. 
INS, 812 F.2d 455, 459 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing cases). An unsuccessful district court action 
could, of course, be followed by an appeal to the court of appeals. See, e.g, Bothyo v. Moyer, 772 
F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1985). Even ifthese appeals were unsuccessful, it is likely that the BIA would 
have acted on the motion by the time the court of appeals acted on the appeal. Cf. Matter of 
Ghalamsiah, 806 F.2d 68, 70 n.3 (3d Cir. 1986) (INS did not appeal from district court's decision 
to grant a stay because the BIA was likely to act on the motion to reopen before an appeal could 
be heard). But see Gallanosa by Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(appeal of immigration judge's denial of motion to reopen was still pending before the BIA when 
appeal of district court order was acted on by court of appeals). Needless to say, many aliens will 
not be in a financial position, or will not think it is worthwhile, to delay their stay in the country 
through these various maneuvers when their chance of ultimate success in gaining legal status is 
slim. See also note 36 supra. 
153. See generally Note, supra note 136. 
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orders."154 It is true that the Third Circuit's position prevents an alien 
from delaying more than six months before filing a petition for review 
of the deportation order. However, by adopting the view that each 
order should be considered separately, the Third Circuit is sacrificing 
significant gains in judicial economy that could be achieved by review-
ing the orders together. Where an alien's motion is pursued in good 
faith, the procedures required by the Third Circuit approach - the 
filing of two or more petitions followed by two or more rounds of judi-
cial review155 - seem unnecessarily cumbersome and wasteful of 
resources. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts should adopt a "good faith approach" to the section 106 
timeliness issue. This approach best balances the competing concerns 
expressed by Congress in enacting section 106: minimizing the 
number of judicial reviews received by aliens under deportation or-
ders, discouraging frivolous or dilatory tactics, and ensuring fair pro-
cedures for aliens. The good faith approach is also in accord with 
Supreme Court cases interpreting section 106(a) jurisdiction, in which 
the Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress intended to pro-
vide a unitary review procedure for issues arising out of deportation 
proceedings. As the INS urged in Giova, "an order declining to reo-
pen the proceedings is ... intimately and immediately associated with 
... the final order of deportation"156 and so, where possible, should be 
treated as an adjunct of the principal order. However, when an alien 
has abused the administrative process by filing frivolous motions in 
order to attempt to prolong his stay in the United States, such tactics 
should not be permitted to delay the six-month time limit on filing a 
petition for review of the final deportation order. 
- Marilyn Mann 
154. Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1986). 
155. For a discussion of a situation in which the Third Circuit approach could lead to consol-
idated review of the deportation order and denial of the motion, see note 129 supra. 
156. Brief for Respondent at 18, Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964) (No. 23). 
